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Earlier research showed that during the 1980s and 1990s most of the global agricultural trade expansion took place among the industrial countries and among countries within trade blocs. These were also periods of declining agricultural prices. These prices increased during the 2000s, there were continuous trade reforms, and many developing countries started to support their agricultural sectors. This paper analyzes trade flows during the past two decades, and tries to measure whether all these This paper-a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the patterns of growth and structure in agricultural trade and policies in industrial and developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at fng@worldbank.org.
developments have changed the trade balances and the share of different groups within the global trade flows. In addition, it looks at the trade balances on food to see the impact of these changes on net food importing countries. In conclusion, unlike the case with manufacturing, developing countries have not been able to increase their export shares in agriculture as significantly. They have maintained their trade shares by primarily expanding exports to other developing countries.
I. Introduction
The last few decades have been a period of very rapid export growth from developing countries, aided by the growth of the world economy, lowering of trade barriers, and increasing supply capabilities in developing countries. Increased import and export shares in total output have been a key source of growth in many developing countries. This growth has been fastest in manufacturing, where global levels of protection have been reduced significantly.
2 Growth has been slower in agriculture, where significant protection still remains. Aksoy (2004) , in a summary paper on trade flows, concluded that while there has been tremendous change in the past 20 years in global specialization and trade in manufacturing, there has been relatively little structural change in global agricultural trade flows. His data started in 1980 and ended in 2001. Since then, world trade has expanded at a faster rate, and the period around the year 2001 was a period of declining agricultural prices. For most agricultural commodities, 2002 is the bottom of the price cycle. The late 2000s, on the other hand, have seen very different developments. Towards the end of this period there was a major agricultural price spike, shortage of commodities, and reevaluation of the basic hypotheses about agricultural surpluses (World Bank, 2008) . New developments such as such using grains for bio-fuels, export controls, and greater demand by China and other developing countries for meats, grains etc, have led to agricultural, and especially food prices increasing very rapidly.
While the 1990s were a period of rapid trade reform in developing countries and of implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, the Uruguay Round seems not to have yielded any meaningful reduction in agricultural protection in industrial countries. Protection in OECD countries increased during the 1960s and 1970s, reaching its peak in the late 1980s. There is little evidence that protection decreased significantly in the 1990s (Nogues 2002; Ingco 1997) . The 2000s are somewhat better because support to agricultural has declined during the late 2000s, caused mainly by the price increases for agricultural commodities. 3 In most of the middle income developing countries, support for agriculture has increased during the last decade. In addition, there are new sets of information on the level of protection in developing countries that indicate an increase in support to agriculture by many developing countries (Kym Anderson et al, 2009 ). Furthermore, these price increases have led to developments where many countries have placed export restrictions on food products distorting the agricultural trade policies even further.
This paper examines the growth and structure of agricultural trade between 1990 and 2007. Data include 2007 but miss the agricultural price peak in 2008. Even with this limitation, we think that even this shorter period is instructive to observe the changes that have taken place. In this updating, the focus is again on the agricultural performance of industrial and developing countries and of specific commodity groups.
2 Annex shows the changes in trade shares and gives and example where trade growth depends more on changes in markets shares than demand growth. 3 In most countries, support to agriculture is given on the basis of price levels. This is done either by setting the supports on nominal levels, or setting fixed nominal value tariffs. If prices go down, then the support levels increase. When prices go up, as was the case in late 2000s, support levels decrease. In addition to this cyclical adjustment, many countries also lower their trade barriers when food prices go up (WB 2008) .
II. Price Behavior
One of the important developments recently is the gradual increase in agricultural prices, especially after the mid 2000s (Table 1) . While agricultural prices were declining during the 1990s, they increased very rapidly during the 2000s. This is a period of low inflation and price increases, outside basic commodities, was very limited. MUV index which measures the traded prices of manufactured goods do not increase at the same rate. Within agriculture, the difference between the weights for developing country exports and world exports is now very small, showing greater decline in 1990s and faster increase in the 2000s. 200.00 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6
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Agricultural Price Index (WW) MUV Figure 1 shows the price series for agricultural prices with world weights and the MUV going back to 1980. There is declining prices until 2001 with cyclical fluctuations in the mid 1990s. Agricultural prices came down 23 percent during the 1980s and 15 percent during the 1990s. After 2002, there is a steady rate of price increase until 2008 of more than 60 percent. The price increases since 2002 are quite unusual and during the postwar period price spikes of similar proportions is seen during the Korean War around 1953 and during the oil price shock around 1974. Finally, 2000/01 which is used as a base year, and an end point of earlier exercises, is a period where agricultural prices are the lowest whereby give a distorted picture of price developments.
In the common agricultural price indexes, many of the new product groups are not fully covered. The main agricultural price index is created by the World Bank and IMF. From the price indexes, it is possible to separate agricultural prices into three components. First is the food category which includes mostly temperate food products such as meats, and grains. It partially corresponds to the temperate product category we use in this paper. Tropical beverages are items such as coffee, tea, and cocoa, the traditional commodities exported by developing countries. Final group is agricultural raw materials, a group which includes cotton. Figure 2 shows the behavior of food and other agricultural prices since 1980. 250.00 300.00 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8
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As can be seen from figure 2, all prices have increased significantly after 2002. Food prices have increased more than other prices and end up being much higher than prices during the earlier period. Beverages prices decreased significantly during the 1990s and then had a smaller price increase during the mid 1990s. It is the groups whose volatility is the highest. Raw materials prices showed very little cyclical behavior until last few years. Food prices are somewhere in between but increased much more than other prices during the last price spike. Prices of a recently expanding food group which is fruits and vegetables and categories such as seafood and processed foods do not have very reliable price indexes. Thus, we can not usually have real trade flows at a disaggregated level and many of these are biased in favor of traditional traded commodities.
III. Growth in Agricultural Trade
World agricultural trade in 2000/01 was $1,014 billion, up from $385 billion in 1990/91.
5 Table 2 shows the growth rates of world exports. Real manufacturing export growth increased at similar rates during the two periods (about 8.5 percent p.a.). Agricultural trade on the other hand, decelerated significantly from close to 6 percent p.a. to 1.5 percent (table 2) . Developing country export rates also decelerated both for agriculture and manufacturing. For manufacturing the decline in growth rates are modest, from a very high rate of 14.6 percent p.a. to 12.3 percent p.a. These are both very high rates. For real agricultural export growth, the decline is much larger. Annual export growth rates decline from 7.5 percent p.a. to only 2.7 percent p.a. When one looks at the components of the agricultural export growth rates for developing countries, there is a deceleration in their export growth rates to both developing and industrial countries. Export growth to other developing countries decrease from 15 percent p.a. to only 4.5 percent. Still, the growth rates to other developing countries are much higher at 4.5 percent p.a. versus only 1.1 percent for the exports to industrial countries. These differential growth rates are reflected in the shares of exports in world trade in developing countries (Table 3) . Their share in manufacturing exports rose dramatically, from 20 percent in 1990/91, to 34 percent in 2000/01, and to 42 percent in 2006/07; with higher exports to both developing countries and industrial countries. It is the expansion of their exports to developing countries that is much more dramatic, from 4 percent in 1990/01 to 20 percent in 2006/07. It is also in an area where the world trade has grown very rapidly.
In agricultural trade developing countries also had some increases in their market shares, but not as big as the market shares in manufacturing. Their share in world agricultural exports increased from 32 percent in 1990/91 to only 42 percent in 2006/07. Most of this gain came from expansion of exports to other developing countries (about 12 percentage points). The share of their exports to industrial countries actually declined. Overall, the weight of industrial countries gradually decreases in world agricultural trade (see Table 6 also). In 1990/01, they constituted 76 percent of world imports and by 2006/07 this ratio had declined to 64 percent. In 1990/01 almost 67 percent of these imports were met by other industrial countries. In 2006/07, 66 percent were met by other industrial countries. So the change is not very large and there is little real structural change. In manufacturing, their import share decreased from 76 percent to 60 percent. More important, in 1990/01, 79 percent of these manufacturing imports were met by other industrial countries. In 2006/07 only 63 percent was supplied by industrial countries, a very large structural change.
In 1990/01, only 7 percent of world agricultural exports were among the developing countries. Despite the growth of intra developing country agricultural trade, it only accounted for about 20 percent of world exports in 2006/07. Developing countries still export a greater amount to industrial countries than to other developing countries. Despite these changes in the shares, nearly half of world agricultural trade still takes place between industrial countries.
The last point is the pattern of agricultural production growth in industrial and developing countries (Table 4) . Growth rates have accelerated in developing countries and decelerated in industrial countries. So it is not the increases in domestic supply that has reduced the growth of agricultural exports from developing countries. There is also a decline in the demand for these commodities. The European Union (EU 15) is the largest trader, with exports of $377 and imports of $420 billion. Developing countries as a block are the second largest trader, with exports of $420 and imports of $368 billion. Trade among developing countries is also increasing, with almost 55 percent of their agricultural imports coming from other developing countries. However, only 47 9 Here we are not including the new members of EU because there is a change in their trading status in the middle of the periods and thus they are included in middle income developing countries. 10 If we include 12 new EU countries in the intra EU trade, it has increased. percent of their agricultural exports are to other developing countries, showing the continuing importance of industrial country markets for their exports. In 1990/01, these ratios were 42 and 22 percent respectively. This is a very large swing, where developing countries are trading much more among themselves than was the case two decades ago.
For low-income countries, other developing countries accounted for 51 percent of their exports and 69 percent of imports in 2006/07; up from 27 percent and 57 percent respectively in 1990/91. Thus, other developing countries are now a bigger market for the exports of low income countries than the industrial ones. Shares for middle-income countries were similar, with other developing countries accounting for 47 percent of their exports and 50 percent of their imports in 2006/07. Developing countries have become major players in the world agricultural trade, especially if intra-EU and intra-NAFTA trade are excluded. Table 6 shows the net trade flows derived from table 5. They show that, while low income countries have continued to increase their agricultural trade surpluses, middle income countries have had a more mixed performance. They still have an export surplus but a relatively much smaller one. This is contrary to the common belief that low income countries have not benefited from the global trading system, they not only have increased their exports, and their exports have increased more then their imports.
For industrial countries, there are few important developments. Japan continues to be the biggest net agricultural importer in the world. NAFTA has a decrease in its export surplus. It is gradually becoming less of a net exporter. Other industrial countries are becoming bigger net exporters. Developing countries, even if we separate them as low or middle income, are much more heterogeneous. There are small and large low income countries and their performance might be different. China and India, with their large populations and GDP overwhelm other country groups. Some middle income countries, in Asia and Latin America are major exporters. There are industrialized East Asian countries that are major importers. Therefore we have separated developing countries into six groups. These are: small low income countries; large low income countries; China and India; middle income large exporters; middle income East Asian importers; and other middle income countries.
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A contentious issue in the literature has been the trade performance of lowincome countries. Many analysts have argued that the low-income countries have not benefited from the expansion in global trade. This is only partially true in agriculture. Some analysts have argued that it is primarily small low-income countries that are more vulnerable. In table 7 we separate the trade of low income countries into large and small. We also separate India which dominates the low income country group. The results are very different for the two groups. While small low income countries have a trade surplus large low income countries have a trade deficit. While export surplus of small low income countries increased during this period, the deficits of large countries increased. Thus the vulnerable groups that have done badly are the large low income countries.
Middle income-countries, however, performed worse during the 1990s, becoming smaller net exporters, with a shrinking trade surplus with the rest of the world. However, since 2001, their export surplus has started to increase again. There are large differences in agricultural trade performance among the middle-income countries. Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and Thailand are becoming major exporters (see table 7 ). These countries, which do not have highly distorted agricultural trade regimes, are frequently cited as potential gainers from global liberalization. Their export surplus has increased significantly throughout this period, reaching almost 10 percent of world agricultural trade. The upper-middle-income manufacturing exporters in East Asia, another group of developing countries, are becoming major importers of agricultural commodities, along with Japan. Of these, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, China, have distorted trade regimes, while Hong Kong (China), China, and Singapore have liberal trade regimes. Thus, these quite industrialized countries of East Asia, along with Japan, now account for 10 percent of world imports.
China and India, with one-third of the world's population, could emerge as major global exporters and importers. They have also behaved more like the large low income countries. Their trade surpluses have disappeared and they have a trade deficit in 2006/07. This deficit is created by the large deficits of China.
The remaining middle-income countries experienced rapid trade growth during the 1990s, but their trade surpluses shrank considerably during this period. As of 2006/07 they have a small deficit in agricultural trade. The significant trade liberalization among developing countries during the last two decades, especially many middle-income countries, could explain some of the expanding imports of these countries. Source: Based on mirror data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. Table 8 shows the imports and exports of the top 20 countries in terms of sizes of imports and exports. This table also shows the shares of these top 20 countries in total exports and imports over the last two decades. Few things stand out. First, consistent with our earlier findings, most of the large importers and exporters are industrial countries. USA is the world's largest importer and exporter. Among the top 10 exporters, there are 3 developing countries, China, Brazil, and Argentina. Among the top 10 importers, there is only one developing country, namely China.
Big Exporters and Importers
Second, among exporters, most industrial countries have seen a decline in their export shares between 1990/01 and 2006/07. The only exceptions are Spain and Italy. All developing countries, on the other hand have increasing export shares. Among importers, the patterns are more mixed, with some industrial countries and some developing countries having increasing shares. The results are not as clear cut. Most dramatic changes are in China and Japan. China, from being a small importer (1.4 percent of world imports in 1990/01), increased its imports to be the fifth largest importer at 5.4 percent of world imports in 2006/07. Japan, on the other hand, went from the world's almost largest importer to being the fifth. Its imports went down from 11 percent of world imports to about 6 percent.
There are some interesting changes in the net trade position of some of the large industrial countries. For example, Germany was a large net importer of agricultural products in 1990/01. Its net imports constituted about $16 billion which was about 6 percent of world imports. In 2006/07, its net imports had declined to $13 billion, which now constituted only 1.9 percent of world imports. USA moved in the opposite direction. It had a trade surplus $21 billion in 1990/01 which was almost 8 percent of world imports. By 2006/07, its surplus had decreased to $8 billion which constitutes only 1.4 percent of world imports. Among the developing countries, China has moved from being a large net exporter to a large net importer. Its net imports in 2006/07 were $15 billion, more than Germany. 
IV. Trade Intensities
Another related question is whether there have been significant changes in the trade intensities in different groups of countries. Expansion of world trade, lowering of trade barriers have led to much greater specialization, and greater exports and imports with respect to domestic output. More specifically, have there been more specialization and more imports and exports compared to both agricultural and overall GDP? Table 9 shows the ratio of exports and imports to agricultural GDP for selected subgroups of countries. First, unlike other tables, we use the unweighted averages for the subgroups because few countries would dominate the averages. These give equal weights to each country within the subgroups thus showing the average behaviour of countries. We also separated the country groupings by level of development, i.e. industrial versus developing, and by regions with developing. We have 6 regions identified. Table 8 clearly shows that on average, there have been greater specialization and greater shares of both imports and exports for most subgroups of countries. Industrial countries show a large increase in their export and import ratios. This is consistent with increases in their exports and imports, and a decline in their real outputs. Thus, they end up with very high trade to GDP ratios.
12 Of course, as pointed out before, the existence of trade blocks such as EU and NAFTA lead to greater trade among each trade groups.
Trade intensities are much lower for developing countries. They have larger agricultural GDPs, and greater protection. Their agricultural GDP have increased during the 2000s. So the increase in trade intensities (trade to GDP ratios) is much more modest. They have increased to about 60 percent in 2006/07, compared to more than 150 percent for the industrial countries.
Among developing countries, South Asia has the lowest trade intensities, both for exports and imports. They were almost self-sufficient during the 1990/01 period with import and export to agricultural GDP ratios of about 6 percent. This is by far the lowest ratio for any subgroup. While their trade intensities increased, it was still 13 percent for exports and 17 percent of imports.
As expected, Latin America has the highest export to GDP ratio and Middle East has the highest import to GDP ratios. Latin America has emerged as a major exporting region, while the oil exporters in Middle East have become major importers.
Sub-Saharan Africa has seen its import to GDP ratio increase continuously. Its export to GDP ratio has increased between 1990/01, and 2000/01, but decreased since then. This is somewhat different than the other regions.
Despite the variation, every subgroup within developing countries has increasing trade intensities. This implies that agricultural trade is playing a more important role, and agricultural self-sufficiency is losing out.
V. Disaggregated Export Performance
To get an accurate sense of changes in trade, it is important to measure the contributions of different product groups to those changes. Many analysts argue that the markets for traditional exports to industrial countries are static because of both low income elasticities and product substitution. For example, coffee and tea have been partially displaced by soft drinks, cotton by synthetic fibers, and sugar by high-fructose corn syrup.
One problem in analyzing the performance of detailed product groups is the absence of disaggregated price series to deflate the nominal trade data. The price series are not consistent with the trade categories so the disaggregated flows discussed in this section are based on nominal trade data. This forces us to use nominal values and changes in these values over time. Thus it is not possible to separate the price and quantity changes for agricultural product subgroups.
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To examine the detailed trade flows, agricultural products were separated into four groups. One group consists mainly of developing country tropical products, such as coffee, cocoa, tea, nuts, spices, textile fibers (mostly cotton), and sugar and confectionary products. A second is made up of highly protected temperate zone products of industrial countries, such as meats, milk and milk products, grains, animal feed, and edible oil and oilseeds. A third category consists of dynamic nontraditional products, such as seafood, fruits, vegetables, and cut flowers, for which global protection rates are lower. A fourth group consists of other products, including processed agricultural products such as tobacco and cigarettes, beverages, other processed foods, and agricultural raw materials such as hides and skins, crude rubber, wood products etc. Exports of these products are further separated into exports from developing countries, exports from industrial countries, and world exports. World exports show how the world trade has evolved, and which product groups are increasing or reducing their market shares in world trade. Table 10 shows the disaggregated structure of world exports, where each cell is expressed as a percentage of world exports. Table10 clearly shows that the structure of world trade in agriculture has only changed marginally over the last two decades. Fruits and vegetables, which as a subgroup have the largest share of world exports at 14 percent and were growing rapidly during the 1980s, have stagnated. Other products such as alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, at almost 7 percent of world exports, have increased. Temperate food product trade has increased more than other groups. Especially the trade in grains has expanded more rapidly than others. Other two items that have somewhat increased their shares are beverages, and processed foods. We will analyze processed food issues in the next section. In world trade, basic temperate food categories have increased their share. While all subgroups under this heading have increased their shares, grains, and animal feed have larger export share gains. Earlier assumptions by Aksoy (2004) where new products such as fruits and vegetables, seafood, processed foods, would end up dominating the world agricultural trade have not materialized.
14 It has been the temperate food commodities which are traditionally exported by industrial countries have increased their shares. On the other hand, tropical products have continued to lose market shares.
For developing countries the biggest decline in export shares has come in their traditional tropical products, such as coffee and cocoa, and cotton. Along with losing share in traditional commodities, Exports of new and dynamic nontraditional exports, such as seafood and fruits and vegetables have also lost some market shares. There is a large decline in share of exports of seafood, and a marginal decrease in fruits, vegetables and cut flowers. The biggest gains have come in temperate food products. Exports of grains have expanded much faster than others. Export market share gains for beverages come primarily from expanding exports of wine and beer to both developing and industrial country markets. They also increased their exports of processed foods.
Despite these changes, whatever the causes might be, analysis of agricultural trade for developing countries now needs to focus on the non-traditional commodities. Currently vegetables and cut flowers constitute almost 20 percent of the exports of developing countries. Temperate zone products constitute another 30 percent. Exports of beverages and other processed foods now are almost equal to total exports of coffee, cocoa, and tea. Exports of fruits and vegetables alone are more than total exports of tropical products. While the traditional products that have received most of the attention in the literature, they now constitute only 16 percent of the exports of developing countries. Attention also has to be placed on the expanding trade within developing countries in temperate zone products such as milk, grains, and meats. These developments show that many developing countries can compete in the product categories historically dominated by industrial countries and that trade reforms in industrial countries could lead to a large expansion of exports from these developing countries.
Industrial country export structures have also changed very little. 15 And product groups that have changes are very similar to those of developing countries. As expected, they are the main exporters of temperate food products, which constitute 37 percent of their exports. Temperate products plus beverages and processes foods now constitute more than half their exports.
Export Shares by Product and Region
Next question is what has happened to the shares of exports of different regions, and to which markets they have exported these product groups. Table 11 shows the direction of exports from developing countries by product categories and by regions. The geographical structure of developing country total exports has shown some small changes in the past two decades. Almost every region has increased its share of world exports. The decline in the share of industrial country exports have been shared by most of the developing country regions. This is especially pronounced for Europe and Central Asia (ECA) which was primarily a closed region before 1991. 16 The increases are very limited for Middle East and South Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that has a decrease in its export share and the loss of market shares from 1980s are still continuing. Despite preferential access, Africa's export share in industrial country markets has decreased and the increase in its exports to developing countries has not made up for this decline. In tropical products, developing countries' exports to industrial countries have declined significantly as a proportion of world exports, and Sub-Saharan Africa has lost relatively more from this change.
Temperate product exports have increased and essentially because of the increasing exports to developing countries. Again, ECA and Latin America are the major beneficiaries of this increase.
The dynamic products of seafood, fruits and vegetables, etc have not increased as much over the last decades. 17 The reason for it is the decline in the share of exports going to industrial countries, which are not fully made up by the increases in exports to developing countries. The same situation applies to Other Processed foods.
Degree of Processing
Despite significant tariff escalation in processed products, trade has moved toward processed (final) agricultural products and away from raw material and intermediate products. 18 In 1990 On the other hand, there are significant gains made by developing countries in increasing their share of world trade in processed products. This increases their value added and industrial capabilities. Low income countries have also increased the share of processed products in their exports.
More detailed disaggregation of export flows by degree of processing does not yield much more information than the aggregate flows. The export share of final products increased for tropical and temperate product groups. For seafood and fruits and vegetables the shares of final product stayed the same because of the higher value of fresh produce. In tropical products trade among industrial countries is now mostly trade in final products.
A few other points are also important. Intra industrial country trade has much higher proportion of final products. For example, the share of their final products in their exports to developing countries was 42 percent. The same share in their exports to other industrial countries was 52 percent. In 1990/01 these shares were 42 percent for both groups of countries. Thus, the share of final product within intra industrial country trade has increased probably due to lower protection. On the other hand, the share of final products in developing country export to both industrial and developing countries have increased by about 10 percentage points. This probably has more to do with capacity improvements in developing countries. Note: "Raw" includes both raw and intermediate goods, because their movements were highly correlated. Source: Based on mirror data from UN COMTRADE Statistics.
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VI. Net Food Importers
The vulnerability of net food importing countries to food price increases was acknowledged during the Uruguay Round Negotiations leading to a ministerial decision that special measures should be taken to minimize the negative effects of global reforms on food importing developing countries and Least Developed Countries (WTO, 1994 ). An FAO report on Trade Liberalization and Food Security points out that the majority of low-income countries, especially Least Developed Countries, are net food importers (FAO, 2002) . This point has been highlighted by Panagariya (2006) , who argues that global reforms that increase food prices would hurt these poor countries, especially the low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as well as the poor rural households in the poorest countries.
Evidence for these conclusions relies primarily on the analysis undertaken by Valdes and McCalla (1999) and McCalla (2001) . These authors showed that the majority of developing countries are net food importers. But they also show that developing countries are heterogeneous in terms of their food and agricultural trade status. 19 Their results
show that many low-income countries that have larger food deficits are either oil exporters or countries in conflict. The remaining low-income countries, as a group, have a trade surplus in food. If trade balances are measured using broad agricultural commodities, rather than just the narrowly defined food, then low-income countries, and the low-income countries in SSA, have a large agricultural trade surplus. Food deficits of most low-income countries are not that significant as a percentage of their imports. 20 On the other hand, there are a group of countries experiencing civil conflicts that are large importers of food, and cannot easily adjust their production and meet their basic needs. They also need special assistance in the distribution of food within their boundaries. Therefore, one should modify the WTO Ministerial Declaration, and focus on these conflict countries along with a few really vulnerable ones. Ng and Aksoy (2008b) extended their results and measured the changes in net food importing and exporting status between 2000/01 and 2004/05, before the prices increased further. Their results show a small deterioration in food trade balances of low income countries. Their food imports increased at a faster rate than their food exports. For middle income countries, the opposite is true. Their food exports grew at a much faster pace than their food imports. Agricultural trade balances of low income countries deteriorated both as a percentage of their imports or their GDP. Most important, low income countries had much lower agricultural GDP growth rates than middle income countries. Thus agricultural supply responses of low income countries to food price increases have not been as positive as the middle income countries. These results suggest that, in low-income countries, the answers to food vulnerability should probably be addressed in the context of incentives for agricultural production. In most of the earlier work, focus has been on major staples, especially grains as the primary group representing food. The debates on protection and trade policy are carried out usually on individual staples such as rice or maize. To the basic staples, we add fruits and vegetables, which now constitute the largest part of developing country exports, and these are also products that are highly substitutable with the staple foods. Countries are categorized by income level, with additional differentiation as follows. First category is oil exporters, defined as countries where oil constitutes more 24 than 40 percent of exports between 2000 and 2005. A second category is countries in conflict, where armed conflicts affect food production and markets. These countries have great food needs but solutions to their problems lie beyond reforms in global trade regimes or agricultural policies; their food requirements and its distribution within the conflict areas require other support mechanisms. A third category is the small island states. They usually sell services and import most of their needs, including some food. Although their numbers are large, their trade is very small, along with their populations. Thus, in addition to the differentiation by income as middle and low income, three other subcategories were added to the developing countries classification; small island economies, oil exporters, and countries in conflict. Annex table 2 shows the classification of countries in each group. Table 14 shows the number of countries that are net food exporters and importers and the changes in them over this period. Notes: Food is defined as raw food products, including meats and dairy products, grains and cereals, fruits and vegetables, but excluding cash crops and feeds, processed food, and seafood.
The classification of income group is based on 2007 per capita GNI from World Bank WDI.
Countries are excluding those small island economies that are colonized and dependent territories.
Data is computed as two-year average of trade values in SITC Revision 3.
Source: Based on mirror data from UN COMTRADE Statistics.
As expected more countries are net food importers, and overall there is little change during this price increase. 21 Net food importing countries actually decreased from 123 to 122. 5 low income countries switched from a net food exporter to a net importer.
As was the case with earlier findings of Ng and Aksoy (2008b) , the changes are reversed for middle income countries. In that group six countries switched from being a net importer to a net exporter. Notes: Food is defined as raw food products, including meats and dairy products, grains and cereals, fruits and vegetables, but excluding cash crops and feeds, processed food, and seafood.
Number of countries is showed in the parentheses that based on countries reporting GDP data.
Source: Based on mirror data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. Table 15 shows the net food trade balance of same groups of countries. Trade surplus of industrial countries have declined. Middle income countries have become net exporters. And low income countries have become a large net importer. In terms of vulnerability, either in terms of trade or GDP, most vulnerable groups are either oil exporters or countries in conflict. The reversal in the balances of low income countries have also come primarily from increased imports of oil exporting and civil conflict countries. Oil exporters are based on at least 40 percent of fuels in total merchandise exports from COMTRADE Statistics. Small islanders are those small economies with independent or autonomous administration, excluding colonized or dependent territories.
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VII. Conclusion
Civil conflict countries are drawn from countries with recent serious war outbreaks from the study by Paul Collier on "Economic Cause of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy", 2000.
* Excluded from oil exporter group. ** Included in the middle income small islander group.
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators database and UN COMTRADE Statistics.
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Annex: Role of Demand and Changes in Market Share
Low income elasticities for agricultural products, especially in industrial countries, are identified as the primary reason for the slowdown in global agricultural trade growth. These low income elasticities are contrasted with higher income elasticities for manufactured products. While this is true in the long run, it is not clear whether trade and demand growth are highly correlated in the medium run. Variables such as level and changes in protection and the degree of comparative advantage play an important role.
If world trade expands primarily because of increases in demand, then slower agricultural trade can be explained by lower income elasticities and lower income growth in industrial countries. But if the primary cause of trade expansion over the medium run is restructuring of production and changes in both imports and exports, without commensurate changes in total demand, then changes in trade regimes can explain a significant part of trade growth. Over the last three decades merchandise trade has expanded much faster than demand, showing the importance of production restructuring. Unfortunately, the systemic information that is necessary to decompose the determinants of export growth exists only for manufacturing. There is very limited information for agriculture.
When manufacturing (including food processing) import growth to industrial countries (Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United States) is decomposed between demand and market share changes, growth accounted for 32 percent of import growth and changes in market share for 68 percent. For imports from developing countries growth contributed only 21 percent while changes in market share contributed 79 percent (Aksoy, Ersel, Sivri 2003) . The examples of food processing, garments, and glass products illustrate the lack of a strong relationship between import and demand growth. The three sub sectors have similar demand growth rates but very different import growth rates. The import growth rates are different not only for imports from developing countries but for imports from rest of the world as well. Depending on policy regimes and changes in policy regimes, trade growth rates can be very different from growth rates in demand.
